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I. Introduction
The first section of this survey examines significant decisions from U.S. courts in 2008
that will be of interest to practitioners in the field of international commercial arbitration.
Of particular note, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two significant decisions construing
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In Preston v. Ferrer, the Court affirmed the supremacy
of the FAA over inconsistent state laws. In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, the Court held
that parties may not expand through contract the scope of judicial review of arbitral
awards set forth in the FAA. Hall Street has already divided lower courts regarding the
continuing viability of "manifest disregard of the law" as a ground for vacating awards
under the FAA. In its decision, the Court considered but did not decide whether "mani-
fest disregard" was a non-statutory ground and thus impermissible, or simply a judicial
gloss on the express statutory grounds and thus still viable. In other decisions concerning
the enforcement of arbitration clauses, U.S. courts continued to interpret broadly the pre-
emptive reach of the New York Convention.
Similarly, the courts firmly rejected collateral attacks on arbitral awards falling under
the Convention. The Fifth Circuit, for example, dismissed one petitioner's creative ef-
forts to repackage its allegations of arbitrator corruption as RICO claims. It held that any
attempt to set aside the award had to be made in a court of "primary jurisdiction," i.e., one
located in the country designated as the place of arbitration. A district court imposed
heavy contempt sanctions on a party that refused to comply with its order confirming a
foreign arbitral award, finding that the party had been using the Ukrainian courts in a
vexatious and collusive attempt to avoid its obligations. Several district courts also consid-
ered when it is appropriate to stay enforcement of awards, either because of pending set
aside actions in foreign jurisdictions or because of related arbitration proceedings. Finally,
the Second Circuit ruled that section 7 of the FAA does not permit pre-hearing document
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discovery from non-parties, while two district courts joined an emerging consensus that
28 U.S.C. § 1782 does permit discovery in aid of foreign private arbitrations.
The second section of this survey looks at major developments from 2008 in the field of
investment treaty arbitration. Significant jurisdictional awards demonstrated continuing
debates over issues concerning investor nationality, indirect investment, use of Most Fa-
vored Nation clauses, the availability of local remedies, and the timeliness of claims.
Among procedural awards from 2008, the first decision was issued regarding the use of
ICSID Rule 41(5) to dismiss claims "manifestly without legal merit." There were also
several significant decisions regarding the availability of interim measures, including two
that considered a State's right to enforce criminal laws and one that considered the right
to enforce tax laws. The merits awards saw continued development of fair and equitable
treatment obligations, which were once again at the center of numerous arbitrations. Two
merits awards also ruled on Argentina's use of the necessity defense to justify actions dur-
ing its financial crisis, reaching opposite conclusions. The tribunal in Continental Casualty
was the first to uphold Argentina's necessity defense, a development that Argentina will no
doubt seek to extend to numerous pending cases arising out of the financial crisis.
II. Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts
A. INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
1. Preemption of State or Domestic Law
The U.S. Supreme Court in Preston v. Ferrer held that where parties have agreed to
arbitrate contractual disputes, the FAA preempts any state law that attempts to lodge pri-
mary jurisdiction over the dispute in another forum, whether judicial or administrative.1
In Preston, a California statute regulating talent agent agreements conflicted with the FAA
in two respects. First, it granted a state administrative body exclusive jurisdiction to de-
cide an issue that the parties had decided to arbitrate. Second, it imposed preconditions
on the enforcement of an arbitration agreement not applicable to contracts generally. 2
The Court held that where the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the FAA barred the state
from placing jurisdiction in a state administrative forum. In doing so, the Court refused
to distinguish between administrative and judicial forums, holding that the FAA prohib-
ited states from vesting jurisdiction in any forum other than arbitration.3 The Court fur-
ther held that even if the state statute was construed only to postpone arbitration until
after initial state administrative review, it nonetheless interfered with the federal interest
in streamlined proceedings and expeditious results underlying the FAA.4 The result in
Preston represents a natural extension of Supreme Court authority on the issue.5
Two other notable decisions reaffirmed the principle that the New York Convention
preempts domestic laws that limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In Safety
1. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 988 (2008).
2. See id. at 980.
3. See id. at 987.
4. See id. at 986.
5. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,6 the Fifth Circuit held
that the New York Convention supersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act,7 a federal statute
providing that state laws regulating insurance take precedence over federal laws not specif-
ically related to insurance. The court held that the parties' arbitration clause was enforce-
able under the Convention despite a Louisiana law that would otherwise exclude
insurance disputes from arbitration. The decision, which follows a string of recent district
court cases holding that the Convention supersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act,8 dis-
agreed with a Second Circuit case to the contrary.9 In Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise
Line,10 the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the New
York Convention governed the arbitration clause in a seafarer's employment contract, thus
preempting the Seaman's Wage Act.
2. Contracting for Expanded Judicial Review
One of the most significant developments in 2008 was the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hall Street Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., which held that parties to an arbitration
agreement may not contract for broader judicial review of arbitral awards than that pro-
vided for in the FAA." The arbitration agreement at issue purported to endow the dis-
trict court with the right to vacate, modify, or correct any arbitral award where the
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence or the conclusions of law were
erroneous-grounds not available under the FAA. Hall Street made two arguments to the
Supreme Court in support of its contention that the court was required to apply these
contractually created grounds. First, it argued that if courts could expand statutory review
through such judicially created doctrines as "manifest disregard of the law," then parties
could do so as well. 12 Second, Hall Street claimed that the grounds set forth in Section 10
of the FAA were merely default rules applicable when the parties have not contracted for a
different standard of review. The Court rejected both arguments and confirmed the
award, holding that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur of an arbitral
award. The Court rejected the notion that the existence of the judicially created "manifest
disregard" standard permitted private parties to expand judicial review by contract. The
Court also found no indication in the language of the FAA that section 10 was meant
merely to provide "default" rules.
Perhaps more important than its prohibitions on parties' ability to contract for broader
judicial review, Hall Street calls into question whether parties may continue to seek vacatur
of an award on judicially created grounds not expressly set forth in the FAA, including
manifest disregard of the law or complete irrationality. 13
6. Safety Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 543 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2008).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).
8. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Simon, No. l:07-cv-0899-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL
3047128 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v, SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-1071, 2007
WL 2752366 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., No. 07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689 (D.
Or. Aug. 6, 2007); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
9. See Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996).
10. Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2008).
11. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
12. Id. at 1403.
13. See discussion infra Section B.1.
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3. Removal to Federal Court
Several noteworthy cases concerned Section 205 of the FAA, which permits defendants
to remove an action to federal court "at any time before trial" where the subject matter of
the action "relates to an arbitration agreement or award" falling under the New York
Convention. 14 These cases highlight the complex procedural issues that arise in disputes
involving multiple parties and contracts. For example, the district court in NPI, Inc. v.
Pagoda Ventures, Ltd. held that removal under Section 205 requires unanimity among all
defendants, following a majority of district courts to rule on the issue.'5 In Realty Trust
Group, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Co., the district court ruled that non-signatories to an
arbitration clause could not remove an action to federal court where their claims were not
sufficiently intertwined with arbitrable claims and the connection to the arbitration clause
was too tenuous6 Significantly, the plaintiff had dismissed the two defendants who were
signatories to the relevant arbitration clauses after the case was removed in order to defeat
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Such complexities, however, are not always fatal to removal. The district court in
Huntsman Corp. v. International Risk Insurance17 declined to remand an action that had
been removed by a third-party defendant pursuant to Section 205 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c), which permits removal of an entire action where there are "separate and inde-
pendent" claims that are within federal-question jurisdiction. The court held that the
claims between the defendant and the third-party defendants were separate and indepen-
dent within the meaning of Section 1441(c) and also that federal question jurisdiction
existed because the contracts contained arbitration agreements that fell under the New
York Convention. 18
4. Appellate Jurisdiction
Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA permits parties to take an immediate appeal from any dis-
trict court order denying an application to compel arbitration. Federal circuit courts have
split, however, over whether a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement also has an im-
mediate right to appeal under section 16(a)(1). In Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Inter-
national, Inc.,19 the First Circuit ruled that non-signatories to arbitration agreements
falling under the New York Convention have the right to an immediate appeal, regardless
of the appropriate rule applicable to domestic arbitration agreements, as to hold otherwise
would contravene the pro-arbitration thrust of the Convention. Whether non-signatories
have an immediate right to appeal under section 16(a)(1) was also taken up by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle,20 to be decided in 2009.
14. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2007).
15. NPI, Inc. v. Pagoda Ventures, Ltd., No. 08-CV-346-TCK-SAJ, 2008 WL 3387467, at *9 (N.D. Okla.
Aug. 8, 2008).
16. Realty Trust Group, Inc. v, Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. l:07CV73-HSO-JMR, 2007 WL 4365352, at *3-5
(S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007).
17. Huntsman Corp. v. Int'l Risk Ins., No. H-08-1542, 2008 WL 4453170 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008).
18. See id. at *14-19.
19. Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008).
20. See Arthur Anderson v. Carlisle, No. 08-146 (U.S. 2008).
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5. Class Actions in Arbitration
The relationship between class actions and arbitration has been the subject of much
litigation in U.S. courts in recent years, but the issue has rarely involved the realm of
international arbitration. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,21 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that an arbitral tribunal did not manifestly disregard the law in constru-
ing an arbitration clause in an international maritime agreement as permitting class
arbitration when the clause was silent on that issue. The court stated that in the absence
of federal maritime law or New York State law establishing a rule of construction prohibit-
ing class arbitration where the arbitration clause is silent on that issue, the tribunal was
free to determine that the contract's "silence bespeaks an intent not to preclude class
arbitration." 2 2
B. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
1. Limitations on Judicial Review
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street23 calls into question whether courts
may vacate awards on traditional grounds not expressly set forth in the FAA, including
manifest disregard of the law or complete irrationality. Whether "manifest disregard" will
continue to be a viable standard for vacatur likely will depend on whether the standard is
deemed an extra-statutory ground for review-which would call its viability into doubt-or
whether the standard instead refers collectively to the grounds set forth in section 10 of
the FAA or is merely shorthand for, or a gloss on, sections 10(a)(3) or 10(a)(4) of the FAA,
which authorize vacatur when the arbitrators are "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded
their powers." 24 Until the Court resolves the issue, the continued availability of "manifest
disregard" as a basis for vacatur will remain uncertain.
This issue is important to international practitioners due to the many U.S. arbitral
awards that are "not considered as domestic" under the New York Convention and are
therefore subject to the grounds for vacatur established under U.S. law. 25 Lower courts
are divided on the status of the "manifest disregard" standard after Hall Street. The Sec-
ond Circuit has affirmed the continued viability of "manifest disregard" on the statutory
"shorthand" theory, indicating that this standard is a "judicial gloss on the specific
grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA" and thus "remains a valid
ground for vacating arbitration awards."26 In an unpublished decision, the Sixth Circuit
likewise held that "manifest disregard" remains a viable ground.27 Other cases continue to
work their way through the district courts. The "manifest disregard" standard has been
21. Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
22. Id. at 99.
23. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1396.
24. Id. at 1404.
25. See, e.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20-23 (2d Cir.
1997).
26. Stolt-Nielsen, supra note 21, at 94.
27. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WV-, L.L.C., No. 07-1830, 2008 VL 4899478 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 2008).
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upheld by district courts in the Third2s and Seventh 29 Circuits but has been cast into
doubt by district courts in the First,30 Fifth,31 Eighth, 32 and Tenth Circuits.
33
2. Collateral Attacks on Foreign Awards
A pair of cases in 2008 rejected collateral attacks on foreign arbitral awards. The Fifth
Circuit's ruling in Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corp.34 demon-
strated that challenges to awards based upon arbitrator malfeasance may only be pursued
in the country where the award was made. Gulf Petro concluded a lengthy dispute in
which the petitioner accused prominent arbitrators of bribery, fraud, and corruption in
connection with a Swiss arbitration. Gulf Petro had unsuccessfully challenged the panel's
final award in Swiss federal court but several years later brought suit in U.S. district court,
claiming to have discovered evidence of arbitrator misconduct. Gulf Petro's complaint
included RICO and Texas state law claims and requested that the court vacate the arbitral
tribunal's final award under the FAA.
The court drew a clear distinction between review of awards rendered in a "primary," as
opposed to "secondary," jurisdiction. 3  Primary jurisdiction vests in the courts at the seat
of the arbitration and allows such courts to set aside or modify an award on the grounds
available under domestic arbitration law, as well as those set forth in Article V of the New
York Convention. Courts in other jurisdictions are limited to reviewing whether the
award should be recognized and enforced pursuant to Article V of the Convention. In
addition, a court of secondary jurisdiction can only adjudicate challenges that are raised
defensively when enforcement of an award is sought. Consequently, "a United States
court sitting in secondary jurisdiction lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking
to vacate, set aside, or modify a foreign arbitral award." 36 Thus, Gulf Petro could only
affirmatively move to have the award vacated in Switzerland.
28. See Southco, Inc. v. Reell Precision Mfg. Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
29. See Joseph Stevens & Co. v. Cikanek, No. 08 C 706, 2008 WL 2705445, at *4 (N.D. I11. July 9, 2008).
30. Compare E. Seaboard Concrete Constr. Co. v. Gray Constr. Inc., No. CIV. 08-37-P-S, 2008 WL
1803781, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 18, 2008) (manifest disregard "is really a shorthand reference to the statutory
grounds for vacatur listed in sections 10(a)( 3 ) and 10(a)(4) of the FAA"), with ALS & Assocs., Inc. v. AGM
Marine Constructors, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 180, 181 (D. Mass. 2008) (questioning whether "manifest disre-
gard" remains valid ground for vacatur). See also Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124
(1st Cir. 2008) (stating in dicta that "manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or
modifying an arbitral award").
31. Compare Acuna v. Aerofreeze Inc., No. 2:06-CV-432 (TJW), 2008 WL 4755749, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct.
29, 2008) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had not yet decided the point) and Millmaker v. Bruso, No. H-07-
3837, 2008 WL 4560624, at *6-7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2008) (same), with Householder Group v. Caughran, No.
4:07-CV-316, 2008 WL 4254586, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2008) (rejecting "manifest disregard" standard).
See also Rogers v. KBR Tech. Servs., No. 08-20036, 2008 WL 2337184, at *3 (5th Cir. June 9, 2008) (noting
that Hall Street called into doubt the viability of the "manifest disregard" standard).
32. See Prime Therapeutics, L.L.C. v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008).
33. DMA Int'l., Inc. v. Qwest Communications Int'l., No. 08-CV-00358-WDM-BNB, 2008 WVL 4216261,
at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2008) (noting that no court in the Tenth Circuit had addressed the impact of Hall
Street).
34. Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 512 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2008).
35. Id. at 746-47.
36. Id. at 747.
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The Fifth Circuit also held that the RICO and state law claims constituted an imper-
missible collateral attack on the award. Although the claims regarding arbitrator miscon-
duct were new, Gulf Petro did "seek to relitigate certain issues" since the requested
damages were "the award it believes it should have received in the arbitration." 37 The
court then found that "the ultimate significance of the conduct [Gulf Petro] complains of
can only be found in the effect that it had on the Final Award." 38 Thus, because Gulf
Petro had not alleged that the arbitrators' purported wrongdoing caused any harm inde-
pendent of the award itself, the U.S. court was without jurisdiction to hear the claims.
In Steel Corp. of the Philippines v. International Steel Services., Inc.,39 the district court
denied the respondent's request that an arbitral award rendered in Singapore be denied
enforcement pursuant to Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, which permits
courts to deny enforcement of an award that "has been set aside or suspended by a compe-
tent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made." 40
The respondent claimed that the award had been set aside by a Philippines appellate
court. The court rejected that argument, finding that the Philippines was not the "coun-
try in which, or under the law of which, [the] award was made."4' Notwithstanding that
the relevant contract was governed by Philippine law, the court stated that "Singapore, as
the country in which the award was made and whose procedural law applied to the arbitra-
tion, is the only country with primary jurisdiction to set aside or vacate the award." 42
3. Preclusion of Further Review of Awards
U.S. courts in the past year have strictly precluded parties from seeking to vacate arbi-
tral awards more than once, even where the issues raised in the subsequent challenge
appear to be distinct. In Tembec Inc. v. United States,43 the district court granted a motion
to dismiss Tembec's petition to vacate an arbitral award issued by a NAFTA tribunal.
Tembec had previously filed a petition with the district court in 2005 challenging the
selection of the NAFTA tribunal, the tribunal's jurisdiction, and its authority to award fees
and costs and to consolidate various claims. That earlier petition was dismissed pursuant
to stipulation by the parties, although Tembec unsuccessfully sought to set aside the stipu-
lation of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b), arguing that it had been misled by the United
States. Noting that Tembec's second petition raised some of the same arguments raised in
that earlier Rule 60(b) motion, the district court concluded that Tembec was seeking "the
proverbial second bite of the apple"- and held that the second petition was barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The court considered it irrelevant that the second peti-
tion also raised certain distinct grounds, as Tembec's second petition was "based on the
very same nucleus of facts" underlying the prior action.45
37. Id. at 750.
38. Id.
39. Steel Corp. of Phil. v. Int'l Steel Servs., Inc., No. 06-386, 2008 WL 342036 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2008).
40. Id. at *4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Tembec Inc. v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D.D.C. 2008).
44. Id. at 138.
45. Id. at 141.
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4. Stays of Enforcement
Three notable awards in 2008 addressed when it is appropriate for courts to stay the
enforcement of an arbitral award, whether because of set aside proceedings in another
jurisdiction or related arbitral proceedings that might have an impact on the award.
Article VI of the New York Convention expressly authorizes courts to "adjourn" the
decision on the enforcement of a foreign award where "an application for the setting aside
or suspension of the award" has been made to a court in the primary jurisdiction.46 U.S.
courts regularly grant such adjournments in appropriate circumstances. 47 Applying Arti-
cle VI in CPConstruction Pioneers Baugesellschaft Anstalt v. Ghana,48 the district court agreed
to stay the petitioner's application to confirm two awards against Ghana, as applications to
set aside the awards were pending before the Ghana High Court. Noting that "there are
circumstances under which the [U.S.] court might choose to enforce the Awards even in
the face of a Ghana decision to set them aside," the court stated the petitioner could raise
such arguments if and when the Ghanaian court set aside the awards.49
In contrast to the express authority granted in Article VI, courts have sometimes recog-
nized an "inherent authority" to stay enforcement of an award when related arbitral pro-
ceedings are still pending.50 This issue was raised in two decisions in 2008. In Interdigital
Communications Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,5s the respondent argued that enforcement
of an award should be stayed pending the conclusion of a related arbitration between the
same parties, as the pending arbitration would "supersede" and "render moot" the award
from the first arbitration. While suggesting that it had the inherent authority to grant a
stay in such circumstances, the court ultimately denied the request. The court noted that
such a stay "should not be lightly granted lest it encourage abusive tactics by the party that
lost in arbitration."52 The court also determined that the strong policy goal of expedi-
tiously resolving disputes would be seriously undermined by granting the request, given
the likelihood that the later-filed arbitration would be drawn out. The court further
noted that the latest arbitration was only in its most preliminary stages and had been filed
by Samsung after the earlier arbitration had concluded, which led the court to suspect that
Samsung had initiated the arbitration as a means of prolonging resolution of the previous
dispute.53
In Wartsila Finland OYv. Duke Capital LLC,s4 the Fifth Circuit similarly refused to stay
enforcement of an arbitral award despite a pending related arbitration. Like the Samsung
court, the Fifth Circuit indicated that it might have "inherent power" to stay enforcement
46. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. VI, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2571, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
47. See, e.g., Steven L. Smith, Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards Under the New York Convention,
in PRACTIONER's HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AIND MEDIATION § 8.05[5] (Rufus von
Thulen Rhoades et. al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
48. CPConstruction Pioneers Baugesellschaft Anstalt v. Ghana, 578 F. Supp. 2d. 50 (D.D.C. 2008).
49. Id. at 55 n.3 (citing In re Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996)).
50. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir. 1995) (incidental to its inherent power
to control disposition of cases on its docket, a court may stay enforcement proceedings under the New York
Convention).
51. Interdigital Commc'ns Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 528 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
52. Id. at 360 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
53. See id. at 360-61.
54. Wartsila Finland OY v. Duke Capital L.L.C., 518 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2008).
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in such situations but found that prudential concerns were not present, as there was no
evidence that the respondent would have trouble collecting on an eventual favorable
award. 55
5. Contempt Sanctions
In Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Storm LLC,56 a U.S. district court imposed heavy
contempt sanctions against the respondent and its alter ego parent corporations for failing
to comply with a court order confirming an award in favor of the petitioner. The court's
ruling sent a strong message that efforts to thwart orders enforcing arbitral awards by
engaging in "collusive" litigation abroad will not be tolerated.
Throughout the arbitration, the respondent unsuccessfully argued that various Ukrain-
ian court decisions precluded any award against it Tn Pynlaininr its failure to comply with
the confirmed award, the respondent contended that subsequent orders by the Ukrainian
court "prohibited" it from complying. The district court rejected this contention, stating
that the Ukrainian litigation had been "often vexatious and collusive-in an attempt to
prevent the arbitration from occurring and, after it occurred, from being enforced."s 7
The court went on to find that the respondent and its parent corporations had an "exten-
sive and brazen history" of "using the Ukrainian courts to avoid compliance with their
legal obligations. '5 8 Even absent the evidence of collusion in the Ukrainian litigation, the
court found that the respondent had to "accept the consequences" of its decision to re-
solve disputes via arbitration in New York, "knowing that this might present conflicts with
the laws and courts in Ukraine. ' 59 The district court imposed fines of $100,000 per day,
doubling every thirty days, until the respondent complied with the award.60
C. AVAILABILITY OF DISCOVERY IN AID OF ARBITRATION
1. Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
A U.S. federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, authorizes district courts to compel persons
located in their district to provide testimony or produce documents "for use in a proceed-
ing in a foreign or international tribunal."' 6 1 Although two circuit court decisions had
previously held that this statute did not apply to foreign private arbitrations, 62 those deci-
sions were cast into doubt by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.63 In 2006 and 2007, three U.S. district court decisions held
55. Id. at 295.
56. Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm L.L.C., 587 F. Supp. 2d. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
57. Id. at 598.
58. Id. at 612.
59. Id. at 617.
60. Id. at 621.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1996). Rule 12.
62. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999); Kazakhstan v. Biedermann
Int'l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
63. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
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that parties may use Section 1782 to obtain evidence in aid of a foreign private
arbitration. 64
Two district court decisions in 2008 added to this emerging consensus. The first case,
In re Babcock Borsig AG,65 held that a private ICC tribunal was properly classified as a
"foreign or international tribunal" within the meaning of Section 1782.66 In an exercise of
discretion, however, the court declined to compel discovery because the petitioner had not
yet taken any formal steps toward initiating arbitration and because there was no "authori-
tative proof" that the ICC tribunal would be receptive to the requested discovery materi-
als. 6 7 The district court in Comision Ejecutiva v. Nejapa Power Co. 68 likewise agreed that
Section 1782 could apply to private foreign arbitrations, and the court accordingly granted
the petitioner's application for discovery pursuant to the statute.
This view, however, did not go unchallenged in 2008. The district court for the South-
ern District of Texas concluded in Comision Ejeccutiva v. El Paso Corp.69 that Intel never
explicitly overruled the prior Fifth Circuit decision in Biedermann precluding the applica-
tion of Section 1782 to private foreign arbitrations. Firmly rejecting the reasoning of the
other district court decisions, the court stated that the Supreme Court's Intel decision
"shed no light on the issue" and did not address 'the application of § 1782 to arbitral
tribunals, not even indicta."70 The court accordingly denied the petitioner's application
for discovery in aid of a Swiss UNCITRAL arbitration. This decision signals the likeli-
hood of further disagreement among the courts on the proper scope of section 1782.
2. Discovery Under 9 U.S.C. § 7
Section 7 of the FAA authorizes arbitrators to "summon in writing any person to attend
before them" and to bring "any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed
material as evidence in the case."'71 The courts have divided, however, over whether this
statute permits arbitrators to compel pre-hearing document discovery from non-parties to
the arbitration.72 The Second Circuit weighed in on the issue in Life Receivables Trust v.
Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's of London,73 holding that section 7 does not allow arbitrators to
order pre-hearing production of documents by non-parties. Relying on the plain statu-
tory language, the court held that documents in the possession of non-parties "are only
64. See In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Minn. 2007); In re Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-
82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387 (D.NJ. Apr. 2, 2007); In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga.
2006).
65. In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp 2d. 233 (D. Mass. 2008).
66. Id. at 238 (quoting and citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 255, 258).
67. Id. at 242.
68. Comision Ejecutiva v. Nejapa Power Co., No. 08-135-GMS, 2008 WL 4809035 (D. Del. Oct. 14,
2008).
69. La Comisi6n Ejecutiva Hidroel&trica del Rfo Lempa v. El Paso Corp., MISC No. H-08-3 35, 2008
WL 5070119 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2008).
70. Id. at *4.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
72. See, e.g., Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2004) (denying pre-
hearing document discovery); Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Duncanson & Holt, Inc., 228 F.3d 865 (8th Cit.
2000) (allowing pre-hearing document discovery); Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Science Found., 190 F.3d 269 (4th
Cir. 1999) (allowing pre-hearing document discovery only upon "a showing of special need or hardship").
73. Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's of London, 549 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2008).
VOL. 43, NO. 2
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 453
discoverable when brought before arbitrators by a testifying witness." 74 The court noted
that this interpretation was consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the
time the statute was enacted, which did not allow federal courts to issue pre-hearing docu-
ment subpoenas on non-parties. While acknowledging that its decision might reduce the
efficiency of arbitral proceedings, the court emphasized that arbitrators still possessed "a
variety of tools to compel discovery from non-parties. '75
I. Investor-State Disputes
A. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
1. Investor Standing
Whether a claimant qualifies as an investor under the ICSID Convention or the rele-
vant investment treaty was again an important threshold issue in several cases in 2008. In
Micula v. Romania,76 two claimants, both of whom had renounced their Romanian nation-
ality in favor of Swedish citizenship, alleged that Romania violated its bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) with Sweden by prematurely terminating certain investment subsidies.
Romania argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the two individuals failed
both the "positive" and "negative" nationality requirements imposed by Article 25(2) of
the ICSID Convention. 77 Romania asked the tribunal to adopt an "effective nationality"
test by examining an investor's links to a country instead of looking at the country of
formal citizenship. The tribunal declined to do so, noting that effective nationality was
"disputable in public international law" and did not apply to the ICSID regime.78
In The Rompetrol Group N. V. v. Romania,79 the tribunal addressed a central and recurring
question-whether the ICSID Convention and investment treaties govern claims asserted
by corporations controlled by citizens of the host state. Although The Rompetrol Group
was incorporated in the Netherlands, a Romanian national held an eighty percent stake in
the company80 Romania contended that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction under Article
25(2) because the dispute was, in reality, between a Romanian national and Romanian
authorities8l The tribunal rejected the argument that international law required it to
74. Id. at 216.
75. Id. at 218.
76. Decision on jurisdiction and Admissibility, Micula v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/20
(Sept. 24, 2008).
77. Id. T 49. Article 25(2) of the Washington Convention governs ICSID's nationality requirements. The
principle of positive nationality requires that the claimant be a national of a contracting State of the ICSID
Convention on the date the parties gave their arbitration consent and on the date the dispute was registered.
The principle of negative nationality requires that the claimant not also be a national of the respondent
contracting State on those dates. See also, id. 83.
78. Id. at 11 99-100 (citing Decision on Jurisdiction, Siag & Vecchi v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/05/15 (May 28, 2007)). In addition, the tribunal held that Romania failed to meet its burden of estab-
lishing that the claimants had obtained Swedish citizenship through fraud, error or in a manner inconsistent
with international law. Id. 91.
79. Decision on Respondent's Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Rompetrol Group
N.V. v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/06/3 (Apr. 18, 2008).
80. See id. 43.
81. See id. 50.
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disregard the corporate form in favor of the nationality of the company's shareholders.82
Rather, it concluded that the ICSID Convention allows contracting States to define na-
tionality in investment treaties and that the Netherlands-Romania BIT did not bar the
company's claim 8 3
At issue in Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Kazakhstan84 was whether the claimants could bring
an ICSID arbitration after being taken over by the Turkish Savings Deposit Insurance
Fund (TSDIF), a state agency. Kazakhstan contended that the seizure by the TSDIF
deprived the tribunal of jurisdiction under Article 25(2) because Turkey was the real party
in interest.85 The tribunal disagreed. Although the TSDIF now managed the claimants,
the tribunal concluded that Turkey did not actually own the companies. Despite state
management, the two firms enjoyed a separate corporate existence under Turkish law,
which preserved their claims against Kazakhstan. 86
2. Qualifying Investments
a. Indirect Investments
In Noble Energy, Inc. v. Ecuador,87 Ecuador argued that Noble Energy could not bring a
claim under the ICSID Convention or the U.S.-Ecuador BIT in its capacity as an indirect
shareholder of a local energy company. Although Noble Energy controlled 100% of the
shares of the local company through two intermediate companies, Ecuador maintained
that the indirect interest did not satisfy the definition of "investor" within the meaning of
the BIT. The tribunal recognized that "there should be a cut-off point in the string of
companies to be taken into account" but declined to identify the cut-off point and instead
found that the connection in this case was not too remote to establish jurisdiction.88
In contrast to Noble Energy, the tribunal in Berschader v. Russian Federation89 held that
shareholders of a Belgian construction firm had not made investments within the meaning
of the Belgium-Soviet BIT. Although the corporation itself could seek arbitration for
impairments to investments arising out of a construction contract with the Russian Feder-
ation, ownership of shares in the company did not qualify as an investment.90 The tribu-
nal reasoned that, absent clear language in the BIT, permitting the corporation to bring a
claim was sufficient to protect the shareholders' interests. Professor Todd Weiler filed a
dissenting opinion. He acknowledged that the question was close but maintained that the
82. See id. T 92.
83. See id. 9 109.
84. Award, Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Kazakhstan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No ARB/05/16 (July 29, 2008).
85. See id. 1 241. Under Article 25(1), the ICSID Convention applies only to disputes between a "Con-
tracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by
that State) and a national of another Contracting State .... See id. 91 312.
86. See id. 9 325-27. The tribunal also rejected Kazakhstan's arguments that it lacked jurisdiction because
the claimants' investments were fraudulent. It concluded that the record lacked "conclusive evidence" to
support the allegation. Id. 1 323.
87. Decision on Jurisdiction, Noble Energy, Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/12,
(Mar. 5, 2008).
88. Id. 11 81-82.
89. Award, Berschader v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004 (Apr. 21, 2006). Although issued in
2006, the Berschader award became public in 2008.
90. See id. 11 115-23.
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majority placed "form over substance" in barring claims by the shareholders for mistreat-
ment to the corporation. 91
In a third "indirect investor" proceeding, Societ Genirale v. Dominican Republic,92 the
Dominican Republic argued that the claimant's status as an indirect investor in a local
joint venture precluded jurisdiction under the France-Dominican Republic BIT. It con-
tended that Soci&t6 G~nrale's interest did not qualify as an investment because its status
as an indirect investor in the joint venture was too attenuated, and its holdings did not
contribute to economic development as required by the preamble to the BIT. In rejecting
the argument, the tribunal stated that the general pronouncements found in the preamble
could not alter the meaning of "investment" as specifically defined elsewhere in the
treaty.93 Further, the tribunal concluded that the complex corporate structure at issue did
not affect Soci&t G~n&ale's ability to pursue its claim because the BIT allowed for "great
flexibility" in structuring investments. 94
b. Challenges to the Existence of an Investment
The tribunal in Helnan Int'l Hotels v. Egypt 95 analyzed whether a prior contractual arbi-
tration could deprive it of jurisdiction in a subsequent treaty arbitration. Helnan sought
redress for what it alleged was unreasonable and discriminatory treatment under the
Egypt-Denmark BIT. Egypt argued that the prior arbitration had definitively resolved all
claims relating to the parties' contractual obligations and that, following the termination
of the contract, Helnan no longer had a legal interest or "investment" under the BIT. In
addressing the distinction between the contractual claim and the BIT claim, the tribunal
stated that even "in the absence of a valid contract, it is possible that a certain kind of
conduct of the host state is inconsistent with its obligations under a BIT."96 The tribunal
rejected as irrelevant the argument that Helnan's investment had ceased to exist by the
time it filed its request for arbitration. 97 Here, the existence of the investment itself had
never been contested, and the essence of Helnan's claim was that Egypt's treaty violations
had caused the investment to cease to exist.
In Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador,98 the tribunal addressed claims rooted in
two power purchase agreements between an Ecuadorian state-owned entity and a local
energy contractor, Electroquil. After Duke Energy acquired a controlling interest in
Electroquil, it entered into an arbitration agreement with Ecuador to submit certain
claims to an ICSID tribunal. 99 The tribunal asserted jurisdiction under both the U.S.-
Ecuador BIT and the arbitration agreement. For those claims arising under the arbitra-
tion agreement, the tribunal treated the relevant time of nationality as the time of the
91. Id. % 14 (Weiler, T. dissenting).
92. Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction, Soci&6 G~n&ale v. Dominican Republic, LCIA Case
No. UN 7927 (Sept. 19, 2008).
93. See id. J 32-33.
94. See id. T$ 48, 51.
95. Award, Helnan Int'l Hotels v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/19 (June 7, 2008).
96. Id. 9J 103.
97. Id. 120.
98. Award, Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/19 (Aug.
18, 2008).
99. See id. 62.
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agreement itself.100 For the two claims arising solely under the BIT, the tribunal found
that one claim met the ICSID nationality requirements, and one claim did not, in part
because it arose from the original power purchase agreements entered into by the then-
domestic contractor. 10'
The scope of NAFTA's protection of investments made entirely in a national's home
state was again an issue in 2008, as it was in Bayview Irrigation District v. Mexico in 2007.102
In Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, the claimants challenged under
NAFTA chapter eleven a ban on the import of Canadian cattle imposed by the United
States after a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy was discovered in Alberta. 103
The United States contended that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the cattlemen
were not "investors of another party," as the relevant investments were in Canada, not the
United States. The cattlemen countered that NAFTA was broader than other investment
treaties, requiring non-discriminatory treatment regardless of nationality. 0 4 The tribunal
disagreed with the claimants' reading of chapter eleven. Consistent with the decision in
Bayview, the tribunal held that Article 1101's reference to "investors of another party"
limited jurisdiction to disputes arising from investments made in the territory of another
contracting state. 05
3. Most Favored Nation Clauses
The use of Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses to import dispute resolution provisions
from other investment treaties has generated controversy in recent years. 106 Two awards
published in 2008 highlight the divergence of authority in this area. The first, Roslnvest
Co. U.K v. Russian Federation,0 7 is one of several arbitrations arising out of the seizure of
oil and gas giant Yukos by the Russian Federation. Roslnvest is a U.K. corporation that
owned seven million shares of Yukos prior to the alleged expropriation. The tribunal
determined that the U.K.-Soviet BIT conferred jurisdiction over claims "concerning the
amount or payment of compensation"')08 following an expropriation but not over disputes
concerning "whether an expropriation occurred and was legal."109 But the tribunal went
on to consider whether the BIT could confer jurisdiction over liability determinations
through the MFN clause, which prohibited "treatment less favourable than that which it
[the Contracting State] accords to investments or returns of investors of any third
100. See id. 147.
101. See id. 11 163-70, 183.
102. Award, Bayview Irrigation Dist. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1 (June 19, 2007).
103. Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, NAFTA/UNICITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction,
(Jan. 28, 2008).
104. See id. 39.
105. See id. T 127.
106. Compare, e.g., Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/97/7 (Jan. 25, 2000) (noting claimant could rely on MFN clause in Argentina-Spain
BIT to trigger dispute resolution clause of Chile-Spain BIT) with Decision on Jurisdiction, Plama Consor-
tium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, Case No. ARB/03/24 (Feb. 8, 2005) (stating MFN did not apply to arbitrations absent
clear statement in the BIT).
107. Award on Jurisdiction, RosInvest Co. U.K. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/2005 (Oct. 5,
2007).
108. Id. T 110.
109. Id. T 114.
VOL. 43, NO. 2
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 457
State." 110 The tribunal held that the MFN clause extended to procedural guarantees such
as access to arbitration, and that RosInvest could therefore rely on the more expansive
dispute resolution provisions of the Denmark-Russia BIT to confer jurisdiction over its
expropriation claims. 111
The tribunal in Berschader reached a different result in its application of the MFN clause
contained in the Belgium-Russia BIT.112 After analyzing previous decisions construing
MFN provisions, 1 3 the tribunal ultimately sided with those decisions holding that MFN
clauses were intended to cover "material benefits afforded by the BIT" and not dispute
resolution clauses unless "the terms of the original BIT clearly and unambiguously so
provide or where it can otherwise be clearly inferred that this was the intention of the
Contracting Parties." 114 In a dissenting opinion, Professor Weiler wrote that "MFN
clauses apply to all aspects of the regulatory environment governed by an investment pro-
tection treaty, including availability of all means of dispute settlement."115
4. Impact of Local Remedies
In the latest chapter of a long-running dispute between Ecuador and Occidental Petro-
leum, an ICSID tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over Occidental's claims that Ecua-
dor breached an oil exploration and development contract. 116 The tribunal rejected
Ecuador's twin arguments that (i) the contract carved out the dispute from ICSID arbitra-
tion, and (ii) the dispute could only be heard in the Ecuadorian administrative courts. 117
The tribunal concluded that the relevant carve-out provision did not establish the unam-
biguous waiver of ICSID jurisdiction. "More fundamentally," the tribunal wrote, Ecuador
could not "invoke its domestic law for the purpose of avoiding ICSID jurisdiction" under
the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.118
The close of 2008 saw the first investment arbitrations brought under the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFI'A). In Railroad Development Corp. v. Guate-
mala,119 Guatemala argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction under CAFTA Article
10.18 because the claimant, through its subsidiary, had initiated two local arbitrations
concerning the same facts. Article 10.18 precludes arbitration of a claim unless accompa-
nied by a waiver of any right to maintain an action in a local court or tribunal regarding
the same issues. 120 Guatemala contended that this provision required the subsidiary to
desist from all local proceedings before the claimant could bring a CAFTA claim. The
tribunal held that the waiver requirement applied to "the specific claim and not the whole
110. Id. 1 126.
111. See id. IT 133-36.
112. Berschader, SSC Case No. 080/2004, 185.
113. See id. 9j$ 162-67.
114. Id. IT 179, 206.
115. Id. 1 20 (Weiler, T. dissenting).
116. Decision on Jurisdiction, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
06/11 (Sept. 9, 2008).
117. See id. 24.
118. Id. I 86-89. The tribunal also held that Occidental Petroleum had complied with the six-month
waiting period required by the U.S.-Ecuador BIT before filing its request for arbitration. See id. 93.
119. Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, Railroad Dev. Corp. v. Guatemala, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/07/23 (Nov. 17, 2008).
120. See id. 1 18.
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arbitration in which that claim is maintained." 12 1 Accordingly, the claims relating to the
investment dispute, as distinguished from the subsidiary's breach of contract claims, could
move to the merits stage.
5. Timeliness
The timeliness of treaty claims was again an issue in several arbitrations in 2008. In a
split decision, an ICSID tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction over claims brought by a
U.S. investor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because the dispute arose prior to
the claimant's purchase of the investments. 122 The dissent argued that, in actuality, the
core dispute arose after the date the U.S. investor took control.123 In contrast, the tribu-
nal in Sociiti Ginerale accepted the claimant's argument that the dispute involved continu-
ing and composite acts. Although the tribunal recognized that treaties generally do not
apply retroactively, it held that it had jurisdiction to consider acts that arose before the
BIT entered into force to the extent that those acts had a continuing effect.124 It could
not, however, maintain jurisdiction over acts that took place before Sociiti Genirale ac-
quired its interest in the investment.125
B. PROCEDURE
1. ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5)
Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules permits a party to object to any claim "no
later than 30 days after the constitution of the Tribunal" on the basis that the claim is
"manifestly without legal merit."'126 The tribunal in Trans-Global Petroleum Inc. v. Jor-
dan127 was the first to accept an objection under this rule since the rule's introduction in
April 2006. Trans-Global asserted three claims against Jordan under the U.S.-Jordan
BIT: (1) failure to provide fair and equitable treatment; (2) impairment of investment
through unreasonable and discriminatory measures; and (3) failure to consult. The failure
to consult claim alleged a breach of Article VIII of the BIT, which requires parties "to
consult promptly" to resolve any disputes in connection with the treaty. Jordan objected
that all of Trans-Global's claims were "manifestly without legal merit" and should be dis-
missed pursuant to Rule 41(5).128
In determining whether to uphold Jordan's objections, the tribunal examined Rule
41(5) in light of its legislative history, other ICSID Rules, and the ICSID procedural
schedule, 129 but declined to consider different arbitral or national procedural rules that
121. Id. 75.
122. Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, African Holding Co. of America, Inc v. Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/21 Ouly 23, 2008).
123. Id. at 10.
124. Societe Generale, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, 94, 101.
125. Id. 9 107.
126. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICISD) Arbitration Rule 41(5).
127. Decision on the Respondent's Objection under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, Trans-
Global Petroleum Inc. v. Jordan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/07/25 (May 12, 2008).
128. Id. 1 19.
129. See id. $ 77-92.
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have objectives similar to those implicit in Rule 41(5). 130 The tribunal found that
Rule4l(5) required it to examine "the legal merits" of each claim and uphold an objection
only in "clear" and "obvious" cases in which the claim is "patently unmeritorious." 131 It
also found that although a tribunal should not weigh the credibility of a disputed factual
allegation when considering the legal merits, it "need not accept at face value any factual
allegation which [it] regards as (manifestly) incredible, frivolous, vexatious or inaccurate or
made in bad faith."1 32 Applying these principles, the tribunal accepted Jordan's objection
to Trans-Global's claim concerning failure to consult. The tribunal held that Jordan has
an obligation under Article VII of the BIT "to consult with the USA as its Contracting
Party" but "owes no similar obligation" to Trans-Global. 133 Since Trans-Global had "no
legal rights under Article VIII" and "the essential legal basis for [its] claim is entirely
missing," the tribunal found the claim "manifestly without legal merit" within the mean-
ing of Rule 41(5). 134
2. Provisional Measures
Two significant decisions on interim measures in 2008 concerned a contracting State's
right to enforce its criminal laws. In Libananco Holdings Co. v. Turkey, 35 Libananco al-
leged that a Turkish court had ordered the interception of private email correspondence
with its counsel and that Turkey had access to approximately 2,000 communications con-
cerning the preparation and development of its case. 136 Libananco sought to exclude Tur-
key from the "current phase of the arbitral process" and requested that the tribunal make a
decision on jurisdiction and the merits without receiving any further evidence from either
party.137
Turkey acknowledged the investigation, but argued that it was directed at a third party,
not Libananco's counsel. Turkey also argued that, as a sovereign, it was entitled to investi-
gate a serious crime within its jurisdiction regardless of the arbitration. Finally, Turkey
contended that Libananco had not been prejudiced by the investigation since Turkey's
counsel gave assurances that they had neither been offered nor seen any of the material
obtained through the court order except when they superficially reviewed certain docu-
ments for privilege. Libananco responded that none of Turkey's assurances addressed the
fact that privileged material might have been seen by Turkish officials who in turn pro-
vided information or instructions to Turkey's counsel. 138
The tribunal observed that "parties have an obligation to arbitrate fairly and in good
faith and that an arbitral tribunal has the inherent jurisdiction to ensure that this obliga-
tion is complied with."'139 It also observed that a sovereign does "have a right and duty to




134. Id. Ij 118-19.
135. Decision on Preliminary Issues, Libananco Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Turkey, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/06/8 (June 23, 2008).
136. Id. 72.
137. Id. 73.
138. See id. 45-46, 75-76.
139. Id. 78.
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pursue the commission of serious crime" that cannot be affected by the existence of an
ICSID arbitration. 140 Nevertheless, the sovereign's right to investigate crime "cannot
mean that the investigative power may be exercised without regard to other rights and
duties, or that, by starting a criminal investigation, a State may baulk an ICSID arbitra-
tion." 141 Applying these basic precepts, the tribunal declined to grant the relief Libananco
requested or to decide whether Libananco had suffered prejudice. Instead, the tribunal
ordered Turkey to ensure that privileged information is not shared with anyone having a
role in the arbitration and to desist from intercepting communications of Libananco's
counsel. The tribunal then undercut the second order by making it subject to the obser-
vation that Turkey "may in the legitimate exercise of its sovereign powers conduct investi-
gations into suspected criminal activities," so long as the information obtained is not made
available to anyone having a role in the arbitration. 142
In City Oriente Ltd. v. Ecuador,143 a Panamanian oil company alleged that Ecuador had
improperly filed criminal embezzlement charges against its personnel in order to force
payment under a recently-enacted tax on hydrocarbon investments and requested interim
measures prohibiting Ecuador from pursuing the charges. Although the tribunal ac-
knowledged "Ecuador's sovereign right to prosecute and punish crimes of all kinds perpe-
trated in its territory," it held that such an undisputed right should not be used as a means
to coerce the payment of the allegedly owing tax amounts."44 The tribunal issued provi-
sional measures ordering Ecuador to refrain from prosecuting any judicial action against
representatives of City Oriente and to cease demanding payment of the tax.145
Days after the ruling, the Ecuadorian General Prosecutor nevertheless proceeded with
efforts to take certain representatives of City Oriente into custody.146 Ecuador subse-
quently filed a request for revocation of the provisional measures, arguing that those mea-
sures protected "an inexistent right" and were "not necessary to prevent irreparable harm"
and that the "decision on provisional measures entail[ed] a ruling on the merits." 47 The
tribunal denied the request.
A third decision on interim measures concerned a State's ability to enforce its tax laws.
In Paushok v. Mongolia,14s the tribunal granted a request for provisional measures sus-
pending the enforcement of two Mongolian laws relating to the taxation of gold mining
and the import of foreign workers. The tribunal observed that the UNCITRAL Rules
provide wider discretion in awarding provisional measures than the ICSID Rules.149 Nev-
ertheless, it noted that even under "the discretion granted to the Tribunal under the UN-
140. Id. 1 79.
141. Id.
142. Id. ' 82.
143. Decision on Provisional Measures, City Oriente Limited v. Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
06/21 (Nov. 19, 2007).
144. Id. 1 62.
145. Id. 11 19, 59-66.
146. See Damon Vis-Dunbar & Luke Eric Peterson, Tribunal Orders Ecuador To Cease Legal Action Against
Foreign Oil Company, INVESTMENT TREAry NEws, Dec. 14, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2007/iu decl4_2007.pdf.
147. Decision on Revocation of Provisional Measures and Other Procedural Matters, City Oriente Limited
v. Ecuador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/06/21 1$ 14, 19 (May 13, 2008).
148. Order on Interim Measures, Sergei Paushok v. Mongolia, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Sept. 2, 2008).
149. See id. 36.
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CITRAL Rules, the Tribunal still has to deem provisional measures urgent and necessary
to avoid 'irreparable' harm and not only convenient or appropriate."' 5 0 The tribunal ex-
plained that it is "internationally recognized that five standards have to be met" before a
tribunal will issue interim measures: "(1) prima facie jurisdiction, (2) prima facie establish-
ment of the case, (3) urgency, (4) imminent danger of serious prejudice (necessity) and (5)
proportionality. "151
With respect to "urgency," the tribunal concluded that the case had "specific features"
indicating urgency because the likelihood of the claimant's bankruptcy had become "very
real" insofar as the claimant could neither immediately pay the tax nor receive outside
financing.152 With respect to "imminent danger of serious prejudice," the tribunal ob-
served that the commonly accepted concept of "irreparable harm" has a flexible meaning
in international law and does not necessarily require that the injury be incapable of being
remedied by an award of damages. 153 Interim measures need only be "necessary," a stan-
dard that is satisfied if the delay in the adjudication of the claim caused by arbitral pro-
ceedings "would lead to a 'substantial' but not necessarily 'irreparable"' prejudice to the
requesting party. 54 The tribunal found that claimants were facing "very substantial
prejudice" because immediate payment of the tax "would likely lead to the insolvency and
bankruptcy" and the complete loss of claimants' investment.155
Finally, in Railroad Development Corp. v. Guatemala, the tribunal addressed the first re-
quest for interim measures under CAYA.156 After observing that there were "no qualifi-
cations to the power of an ICSID tribunal to recommend provisional measures" in either
the ICSID Convention or CAFTA, the tribunal held that "the standard to be applied is
one of reasonableness, after consideration of all the circumstances of the request and after
taking into account the rights to be protected and their susceptibility to irreversible
damage."157
The claimant requested an interim order directing Guatemala to preserve certain docu-
ments during the pendency of the arbitration. To prove the urgent need for such provi-
sional measures, the claimant relied on a recent change of government in Guatemala, the
destruction or loss of documentation during previous changes of administration, and fre-
quent changes in high positions in the current administration. The tribunal declined the
request, observing that a "change of government in the normal course of constitutional
transfer of power" does not justify measures for preservation of documents.'58
3. Challenges to Arbitrators
Two members of the arbitral tribunal in Suez v. Argentina rejected a second bid by
Argentina to disqualify arbitrator Dr. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler from the tribunal pre-
150. Id. 1 39.
151. Id. 1 45.
152. Id. 61.
153. Id. 1 68.
154. Id. 1J9 67-68.
155. Id. 1 77.
156. Decision on Provisional Measures, Railroad Dev. Corp. v. Guatemala, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/07/23 (Oct. 15, 2008).
157. Id. 1 34.
158. Id. at 35.
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siding over three investment treaty disputes arising out of water-services investments in
Argentina.is 9 The two arbitrators ruled that sufficient grounds for removal were
presented neither by Dr. Kaufmann-Kohler's service on the board of UBS, which held
shares in the claimants, nor by her failure to disclose her election to the board. 160 The
tribunal identified four criteria for evaluating whether a relationship with a party under-
mines the arbitrator's independence and impartiality: (1) proximity (how "closely con-
nected is the challenged arbitrator to one of the parties by reason of the alleged
connection?"); (2) intensity (how "intense and frequent are the interactions between chal-
lenged arbitrator and one of the parties as a result of the alleged connection?"); (3) depen-
dence (to "what extent is the challenged arbitrator dependent on one of the parties for
benefits as a result of the connection?"); and (4) materiality (to "what extent are any bene-
fits accruing to the challenged arbitrator as a result of the alleged connection significant
and therefore likely to influence in some way the arbitrator's judgment?").61 Applying
these standards, the tribunal concluded that the relationship between Dr. Kaufmann-
Kohler and the claimants did not indicate "a manifest lack of the quality of being a person
of independent judgment and impartiality of judgment." 162 It also found that Dr. Kauf-
mann-Kohler did not violate ICSID rules concerning disclosure obligations.i 63 Argentina
also unsuccessfully challenged Dr. Kaufmann-Kohler in a separate ICSID arbitration in
2008.164
C. DECISIONS ON THE MERITS
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
One of the more frequent claims asserted in investment arbitrations is violation of fair
and equitable treatment provisions. Given the broad scope of such provisions, fair and
equitable treatment claims can encompass a wide array of state actions that are arbitrary or
unfair but fall short of expropriation. Although this trend continued in 2008, several
tribunals attempted to scale back fair and equitable treatment obligations.
An emerging standard for fair and equitable treatment provisions is the State's obliga-
tion to provide a stable legal and regulatory environment for the investment. This issue
was crucial in BG Group, Plc. v. Argentina,165 where the tribunal held that Argentina vio-
lated the fair and equitable treatment provision of the UK-Argentina BIT by fundamen-
tally revising the regulatory framework for private natural gas distributors after that
country's financial crisis. The tribunal noted that the contracting State's duties "must be
examined in the light of the legal and business framework as represented to the investor at
the time that it decided to invest."166 Although this standard does not require "a freezing
159. See Decision on a Second Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal (May
12, 2008), Suez v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/19, Suez v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/03/17, and AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration.
160. id. TT 11-12, 30.
161. Id. 1 35.
162. Id. 1 40.
163. See id. 1 48.
164. See Challenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, EDF International S.A. v.
Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/23 (June 25, 2008).
165. Final Award, BG Group, Plc. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Dec. 24, 2007).
166. Id. 298.
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of the legal system," it does require States to adhere to "the principles of stability and
predictability" in its treatment of investors. 67 The tribunal found that Argentina violated
those principles by suspending inflation adjustments to gas tariffs, converting dollar-de-
nominated tariffs into pesos, and requiring renegotiation of public service licenses. 16 8
Violations of fair and equitable treatment obligations can also occur where the State's
actions fall short of altering the regulatory framework but nevertheless thwart an inves-
tor's "justified expectations" at the time of the investment. In Duke Energy Electroquil,169
the tribunal held that Ecuador had violated its fair and equitable treatment obligations by
failing to implement a system of payment trusts to guarantee prompt payment by a state-
owned electricity company under two power purchase agreements. The tribunal ex-
plained that "a stable and predictable legal and business environment is considered an
essential element of the fair and equitable treatment standard" and that this stability "is
directly linked to the investor's justified expectations."'170 The tribunal further explained
that these expectations must "take into account all circumnstances, including not only thc
facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and his-
torical conditions prevailing in the host State." 17 1 The tribunal concluded that Ecuador's
failure to establish the payment trusts violated the claimants' legitimate expectations be-
cause they had been aware of the payment problems and specifically requested guarantees
from the state as a condition for investment. 172
In Rumeli Telekom, 173 the tribunal found that the State breached its fair and equitable
treatment obligations by terminating an investment contract without first suspending the
contract and allowing the investors an opportunity to cure their non-performance, as
mandated by the contract. The tribunal also found that Kazakhstan breached its obliga-
tions when it subsequently established a working group to evaluate the decision to termi-
nate the contract. According to the tribunal, the process that led to the working group's
decision "lacked transparency and due process" as the investors had no "real possibility to
present their position."'1 74 The tribunal emphasized that fair and equitable treatment re-
quired the State not only to respect the investor's reasonable and legitimate expectations,
but also to act in a good faith and transparent manner, respect procedural propriety and
due process, and not engage in arbitrary or grossly unfair conduct. In this respect, the
tribunal noted that fair and equitable treatment is "not precisely defined," but instead
"depends on the interpretation of specific facts for its content." 75
Despite the broad application of the fair and equitable treatment standards, other tribu-
nals sought to limit the reach of the doctrine. For example, the tribunal in Metalpar S.A.
v. Argentina176 held that Argentina had not breached its obligations to two Chilean inves-
tors during its financial crisis. The claimants contended that Argentina failed to provide
167. Id. 19 298, 307.
168. Id. T9J 303-10.
169. Duke Energy Electroquil, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/19.
170. Id. 1 339-40.
171. Id. 1 340.
172. Id. T 359-64.
173. Rumeli Telekom, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/16.
174. Id. 617.
175. Id. 610.
176. Award on the Merits, Metalpar S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/05 (June 6,
2008).
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fair and equitable treatment by imposing temporary limitations on the transfer of assets
abroad and by converting dollar-denominated contractual obligations into pesos. Re-
jecting these contentions, the tribunal concluded that no legitimate expectations were
breached by Argentina as the investors had not entered into any type of contract or license
with the State and had been aware of Argentina's precarious financial condition at the
time of their investment. 177 Because the tribunal rejected all of the investors' claims,
Metalpar represents Argentina's first complete victory in the cases arising out of the finan-
cial crisis.
In Helnan International,178 the tribunal rejected a fair and equitable treatment claim
where a government entity terminated a hotel management contract after the hotel's rat-
ing was downgraded. The claimant was a Danish hotel management company that had
contracted with a government tourism body to manage a five-star hotel in Cairo. The
claimant alleged that Egypt had orchestrated the downgrading of the hotel's rating to four
stars in order to justify termination of the management contract and privatization of the
hotel. Although the tribunal agreed that there were procedural irregularities in the gov-
ernment's handling of the situation, it did not find that these irregularities rose to the level
of unfair or inequitable treatment. The tribunal found it significant that the claimant
never challenged the substantive basis for the downgrading of the hotel, only its responsi-
bility for financing improvements. The claimant's failure to make reasonable efforts to
obtain redress from national authorities also cast doubt on the claim in the eyes of the
tribunal.
In Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania,179 the tribunal rejected most of the allega-
tions that Tanzania had breached its fair and equitable treatment obligations during its
oversight and regulation of a water concession operated by the claimant. Although the
tribunal held that certain actions taken by Tanzania violated the treatment standards, in-
cluding its termination and seizure of the concession, most of Tanzania's actions did not
rise to the level of unfair or inequitable treatment. In particular, the tribunal concluded
that Tanzania's failure to ensure government agencies promptly paid their water bills and
its failure to adjust the water tariff to account for changing conditions did not amount to
breaches, as the concession contract provided no clear right to these actions.180 Moreo-
ver, to the extent that certain actions amounted to technical breaches of the BIT, the
tribunal held that these violations did not result in any damages because the claimant's
own poor performance led to termination of the concession.
2. Expropriation
It has become increasingly difficult for claimants to prevail on expropriation claims in
recent years, as tribunals have tightened the standards by which such claims are evaluated.
Although claimants often assert claims for indirect expropriation along with claims for
violations of other treaty protections, the indirect expropriation claims tend to be less
177. See id. 9 182-88.
178. He/nan International, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/19.
179. Award, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22 (July 24,
2008).
180. See id. 9 763-775.
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successful. That trend continued in 2008. The only significant decisions finding an ex-
propriation involved the State's direct seizure of an investment.
The award in Metalpar demonstrates the heavy burden claimants bear in trying to estab-
lish a claim for indirect expropriation. The claimants alleged that certain rights and cred-
its under loan agreements with local companies in the Argentinean automotive sector
were indirectly expropriated as a result of the measures taken by Argentina during its
financial crisis. The tribunal rejected the claim, finding that the claimants failed to show
that the measures had a "sufficiendy severe" effect on their investments to warrant a find-
ing of expropriation.181 The tribunal specifically noted that the investors' Argentinean
subsidiary "continued performing its business activities, negotiating with the customers
that had already signed the contracts and with future customers" and in fact "improved its
production and sales in the Argentine market." 8 2
Two decisions in 2008 found that direct expropriations had occurred. In Rumeli
Telekom, the tribunal held that a creeping expropriation by Kazakhstan had deprived two
Turkish investors of their majority stake in a local telecommunications company. Accord-
ing to the tribunal, this expropriation commenced when the State terminated the claim-
ants' investment contract without first suspending the contract and allowing the investors
an opportunity to cure, as required under the contact. The expropriation was completed
when the Kazakh courts upheld a vote by local shareholders to compulsorily redeem the
claimants' shares and awarded claimants only a nominal sum for their sixty percent stake
in the company, even though the entire company was later sold for $350 million. 8 3
An unusual result was reached in Biwater Gauff, where the tribunal found that a techni-
cal expropriation had occurred but refused to award any damages. The tribunal held that
the State had expropriated the claimant's water concession through a series of actions,
including premature announcement of contract termination, occupation of the conces-
sion's facilities, usurpation of management control, and deportation of staff. The tribunal
nevertheless concluded that when these actions were taken, termination of the contract
"was inevitable, and was going to materialize within a matter of weeks."' 84 The tribunal
further held that, due to a poorly organized bid and various financial problems in the
concession, the fair market value of the concession at the time of the expropriation was
effectively zero. As a result, the claimant could not show that the expropriation caused it
to suffer any economic loss.1 85 Although a majority of the tribunal held that the claimant
had failed to establish a causal link between the treaty violations and its losses, a concur-
ring and dissenting opinion by Gary Born argued that the claim failed because the claim-
ant could not establish that it suffered any losses, not because it failed to show
causation.1 s6
181. Metalpar, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/05, 1 173.
182. Id. 174.
183. See Rumeli Telekom, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No, ARB/05/16, $$ 705-08, 752.
184. Biwater Gauff, ICSID (V. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, 518.
185. See id. 788-807.
186. Biwater Gauff, ICSID (V. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, 15-31 (Born, G. concurring & dissenting).
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3. Necessity Defense
A number of recent ICSID cases involving actions taken by Argentina during its finan-
cial crisis required tribunals to rule on Argentina's assertion that its actions were justified
under a state of necessity defense recognized both by customary international law and the
relevant BIT. This defense has generated some controversy, as conflicting decisions have
raised concerns over inconsistent awards. While a 2006 award in the LG&E arbitration
upheld the necessity defense for part of the financial crisis,18 7 decisions in CMS,18 8 En-
ron,189 and Sempra' 90 rejected the defense in its entirety. Adding further controversy, one
of the arbitrators that served on the Enron tribunal also served on the LG&E tribunal.
Two additional awards were issued in 2008 that considered Argentina's necessity de-
fense, reaching opposite conclusions. In BG, Argentina argued that measures it enacted in
response to the financial crisis were justified because there was a national emergency
under Article 4 of the UK-Argentina BIT as well as a state of necessity under customary
international law. The tribunal rejected both defenses. With respect to the BIT defense,
the tribunal concluded that the terms of Article 4 did not exonerate Argentina's attempts
to handle the financial crises. Instead, the language of Article 4 simply guaranteed that
foreign investors would be treated no less favorably than other investors with respect to
compensation for losses caused by a national emergency. The tribunal noted that the
UK-Argentina BIT did not contain a "national security" exception analogous to Article XI
of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the provision relied on by the LG&E tribunal in partially
upholding Argentina's necessity defense.191
The tribunal also rejected Argentina's alternative defense that its actions were excused
under customary international law based on a state of necessity, as codified in Article 25 of
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.192 Although the tribunal doubted that the
Articles even applied in this situation, it concluded that Argentina had in any case failed to
meet all the elements of the defense. 193 The tribunal emphasized that the necessity de-
fense was "a most exceptional remedy subject to very strict conditions because otherwise it
would open the door to elude any international obligation." 194 The BG decision will
likely generate further controversy, as one of the arbitrators, Albert Jan van den Berg, also
served on the LG&E and Enron tribunals. In fact, Argentina cited the failure to disqualify
Mr. van den Berg as a ground for vacating the award in a petition filed in a U.S. district
court.195
187. Decision on Liability, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1 (Oct.
3, 2006).
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2005).
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193. See BG, UNCITRAL Arbitration, IT 407-12.
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Further muddying the waters, a subsequent award in Continental Casualty Co. v. Argen-
tina196 accepted Argentina's necessity defense for the bulk of the claims asserted against it.
That case involved a U.S. insurance company that provided workers compensation insur-
ance through an Argentinean subsidiary. The claimant challenged several actions taken
during Argentina's financial crises, including the forced conversion of dollar-denominated
assets into pesos and restrictions on asset transfers out of Argentina. At issue was Article
X of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which states that "measures necessary" for the protection
of the State's "essential security interests" and the "maintenance of public order" do not
violate the treaty. 197 The tribunal held that Article XI could apply to a severe economic
crisis 198 and reasoned that protection of public order and essential security interests does
not require that a "total collapse" or "catastrophic situation" has already occurred, as there
is "no point in having such protection if there is nothing left to protect."' 99 Although the
tribunal rejected Argentina's contention that the necessity defense is "self-judging," it nev-
ertheless recognized that evaluation of the defense "must contain a significant margin of
appreciation for the State applying the particular measure: a time of grave crisis is not the
time for nice judgments." 200
Significantly, the Continental Casualty tribunal relied on cases from the GAIT and
WTO context in formulating the standards for the Article XI necessity defense, conclud-
ing that the defense did not require the actions to be "indispensible" or "of absolute neces-
sity."201 Instead, it found that necessity should be determined through a balancing of
several factors, including the importance of the interests at stake, the degree to which the
challenged measures advance those interests, the restrictive impact on international com-
merce, and the availability of alternative measures that do not violate the treaty. 202 On the
facts, the tribunal held that all but one of Argentina's actions were justified under Article
XI.203
4. NAFTA Awards
A long-awaited NAFTA award was issued in late 2007, although not published until
2008. In Archers Daniels Midland Co. v. Mexico,20 4 two U.S. producers of high fructose
corn syrup challenged a twenty percent excise tax levied by Mexico on soft drinks made
with sweeteners other than cane sugar. The tribunal ruled in favor of the U.S. claimants,
holding that the tax had violated two separate Chapter 11 protections. First, the tribunal
held that the tax violated Article 1102, which guarantees that investors will be treated no
less favorably than nationals of the contracting State. Mexico violated this guarantee be-
196. Award, Continental Cas. Co, v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/9 (Sept. 5, 2008).
197. Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. 103-2 (1991).
198. See Continental Cas. Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/9, 1J 71-73.
199. Id. 180.
200. Id. $ 181.
201. Id. 1J 189-95.
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203. See id. 11 196-233.
204. Award, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05 (Nov. 21,
2007).
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cause the tax was aimed at protecting domestic sugar producers from competition by for-
eign producers of high fructose corn syrup, two groups that were in direct cornpetition.205
Second, the tribunal held that Mexico also violated Article 1106.3, which prohibits
States from imposing certain performance requirements on investors, either to achieve a
given level of domestic content or to accord a preference to goods produced domestically.
According to the tribunal, Article 1106.3 "prohibits Member States from imposing per-
formance requirements upon any investor from the NAFTA region, including [Mexico's]
own investors." 206 Because Mexico required domestic bottlers to use cane sugar to receive
exemption from the tax and thus accorded a preference to domestically produced cane
sugar, the tribunal found the tax violated Article 1106.3.207 The tribunal rejected, how-
ever, the claim for indirect expropriation under Article 1110, finding that the investors
had not lost control over their investment or been deprived of most of its economic
value.208
In another notable aspect of the award, the tribunal rejected Mexico's contention that
the tax was a valid countermeasure under customary international law because the United
States had breached its own NAFTA obligations by restricting U.S. market access for
Mexican sugar exporters. The tribunal concluded that the tax was neither enacted in re-
sponse to alleged breaches by the United States nor intended to induce compliance by the
United States, as required under Article 49 of the ILC Articles. 20 9 The tribunal also
found that the alleged countermeasure was not proportional to the alleged wrongful act, as
required by Article 51 of the ILC Articles. 210 Arbitrator Arthur Rovine issued a separate
concurring opinion, challenging in principle the availability of a defense based on counter-
measures. In his view, rights under NAFTA Chapter 11 belong to individual investors and
cannot be suspended as a result of countermeasures taken against the State of the
investor.21'
ADM was one of three NAFTA cases filed against Mexico in connection with the tax on
high fructose corn syrup. An award on liability was also issued in Corn Products Interna-
tional v. Mexico2"' in January 2008, although that award has yet to be released. The tribu-
nal in Corn Products also found Mexico to have breached NAFTA, and a hearing on
damages was held in July 2008. A third case, Cargill, Inc. v. Mexico, 2 13 is still pending.
D. DAMAGES
The damage awards issued in 2008 included two very large assessments-$185.3 million
in BG2 14 and $125 million in Rumeli Telekom21S-and a number of smaller awards-$33.5
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million in ADM,216 $25 million in Desert Line Projects v. Yemen, 217 $5.6 million in Duke
Energy Electroquil,218 $18.4 million in Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. I Ltd.
v. Peru,219 and $2.8 million in Continental Casualty.220 The award in BG is the latest in a
growing number of large awards against Argentina involving claims stemming from mea-
sures taken in response to its financial crisis.
One noteworthy development in 2008 was the consideration and assignment of so-
called "moral damages." In Desert Line Projects, for example, the claimant sought moral
damages for the harm sustained to its reputation, credit, and business opportunities, as
well as for the physical stress and anxiety inflicted upon its company executives as a result
of being harassed, threatened, and detained. The tribunal rejected the respondent's argu-
ment that such damages were unduly speculative and unsubstantiated, writing that "non-
material damages 'may be very real, and the mere fact that they are difficult to measure or
estimate by monetary standards makes them none the less real and affords no reason why
the injured person should not be compensated.' 221 Finding that the respondent had ac-
ted maliciously in harming the claimant, the tribunal awarded $1 million in compensation
for moral damages. 222
There was frequent discussion in 2008 damage awards concerning the appropriate
quantum of interest to afford full and fair compensation to the claimant, with an increas-
ing number of tribunals awarding compound rather than simple interest. Finding that
"simple interest cannot be relied upon to produce full reparation for a claimant's loss," the
Continental Casualty tribunal interpreted various case precedents, arbitration rules, and le-
gal commentaries to endorse the discretionary award of compound interest "if it is neces-
sary to ensure full reparation. '223 The tribunal noted that a study of fourteen recent
ICSID arbitrations had found that eight of the tribunals ordered compound interest, three
ordered simple interest, and one ordered no interest (the remaining two did not disclose
whether compound or simple interest was ordered).2 24 Interest determinations in damage
awards issued in 2008 were more evenly split: four tribunals ordered simple interest and
three tribunals ordered compound interest. 2 5
As to the assignment of costs and legal fees, a growing number of tribunals are espous-
ing the "loser pays" principle in lieu of the traditional practice of assigning costs in equal
portion and leaving the parties to cover their own legal fees. Under this approach, tribu-
nals may take into account "the nature of the dispute, the novelty of the legal issues, and
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the conduct of the parties in the proceedings." 226 In Rumeli Telekom, for example, the
ICSID tribunal "condemned" the respondent to pay fifty percent of the claimants' legal
costs and fees because they "had no option but to bring this arbitration forward and to
incur the related costs" to obtain justice. 227 The tribunal further justified this apportion-
ment because the claimants had "prevailed on the substance of the dispute" but "failed on
a number of their allegations and the amount of damages awarded is less than the
[amount] claimed."228 Similarly, the Desert Line Prjects tribunal assessed against the re-
spondent seventy percent of the costs and a large portion of claimant's legal fees due to its
loss on the merits and its "insufficient" cooperation in providing documents and testimo-
nial evidence. 229 In contrast, the ADM tribunal followed the traditional rule of splitting
costs and fees, noting that the proceedings "were expeditiously and efficiently conducted
by the representatives of both parties."230
E. ANNULMENT AND SET ASIDE ACTIONS
No significant final decisions on annulment requests were issued by ad hoc annulment
committees in 2008.231 But in two annulment proceedings brought by Argentina, annul-
ment committees addressed the standards applicable to a request for security pending the
annulment decision. 232 Consistent with its recent practice of challenging every ICSID
award, Argentina sought annulment of the Azurix and Enron awards in 2008. Argentina
has publicly adopted the position that an ICSID award does not trigger an immediate
obligation to pay because award creditors must submit to a court proceeding in Argentina
to collect on their award.233 This led both companies to request that Argentina post a
security to guarantee payment in the event the committee rejected Argentina's annulment
request.
The committee found that Argentina's stated position was in breach of the ICSID Con-
vention and its BIT with the United States.234 Nevertheless, the committee made clear
that requiring security was disfavored and thus rejected both requests.235 The committee
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agreed, however, to revisit its decision if Argentina had not reconsidered within sixty days
its policy on the enforceability of arbitral awards. 236
236. Enron Corp., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3, $ 103.
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